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BOOK REVIEWS
A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS. By Ronald
P. Sokol. (Michie 1965, Pp. 277. $10.00).
This book, written by Professor Sokol, Lecturer in Law and
Director of Appellate Legal Aid at the University of Virginia
Law School, provides both bench and bar with a sorely needed
legal manual setting forth simply and concisely the statutory
and case law applicable to federal habeas corpus. Since 1886
no textbook has been written on that subject 1 even though in
more recent years applications for federal habeas relief have
nearly flooded the federal courts and have hampered their speed
2
of dispensing justice.
Today, the federal writ of habeas corpus may be sought by
those illegally in federal custody,8 by those illegally in custody
for an act done under federal authority 4 and by those illegally in
custody for commission of an act permitted by the law of nations.5 But it is primarily sought by convicted state prisoners, allegedly "in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or
treaties of the United States." 6 As a substitute for federal habeas
corpus, the federal prisoner seeking post-conviction relief on the
ground that his sentence was illegally imposed files a motion to
"vacate, set aside or correct the sentence," commonly referred to
as a section 2255 motion.7 It is the latter two subjects, the state
prisoner's application for federal habeas corpus and the federal
prisoner's motion to vacate the sentence, to which Sokol largely
addresses himself.
A brief historical perspective seems appropriate. During our
country's earlier years, federal habeas corpus was available
1. This fact is pointed out by Sokol in the Preface to A HANDBOK OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS at v (1965). The 1886 book was HumD, A TREATISE
ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CoRPus

(1886).

2. See Applications for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review
of Sentences in the United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1963) ; United States
ex rel. Walker v. LaVallee, 224 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (1958).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (1958).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (1958).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1958).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) ; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
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only to federal prisoners8 who were in custody without judicial
process or pursuant to an order of a court which lacked jurisdiction.9 Eventually, in 1867, Congress expanded the writ to
make it available to persons held in state custody in violation of
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,10 but the
concept of jurisdiction was retained by the courts, thus limiting
the scope of habeas corpus review.1 1 Therefore, once it was determined that a court had jurisdiction to deal with the offense
charged and the person before it, the detention of the habeas
petitioner was generally found valid. During the latter part of
the nineteenth century, however, and the early years of the
twentieth, the traditional, judicially-imposed jurisdictional limitation on the scope of habeas corpus was slowly abandoned in
favor of a more flexible standard: the constitutional commandment of due process of law. 12 Thus, where there was a deprivation of a prisoner's constitutional rights, federal habeas relief
was generally granted. This expansion of the writ, coupled with
the incorporation during the present century of many of the safeguards of criminal procedure contained in the Bill of Rights,
theretofore thought inapplicable to the states, 18 has made increasingly more numerous the occasions upon which federal habeas
will lie. It is from this perspective that we must consider Sokol's
handbook on federal habeas corpus since as a result of the historical development of the writ and the broadening area of constitutional rights the need for such a book has become acute.
For all lawyers, but particularly those who may be appointed
to represent some indigent habeas petitioner or section 2255
movant, Sokol's habeas handbook is absolutely essential if they
are unacquainted with collateral attacks in the federal courts on
criminal convictions. For those members of the bar who are
acquainted with that aspect of the law, the book will serve as an
endless time saver in relocating and simplifying the pertinent
statutory and case law applicable to filing an application for
federal habeas relief, preparing for an evidentiary hearing, and
taking an appeal from the denial of relief.
Concerning the writ's availability, Sokol points out that habeas
corpus is a civil remedy, legal rather than equitable in nature,
8. 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789).

9. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 193 (1830).
10. 14 Stat. 385 (1867), now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1958).

11. E.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).

12. E.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
13. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss2/9

2

et al.: LAW
BOOKRviEwo
REVIEWS
SouTn CAno~inA

[Vol. 18

but governed by equitable principles. There are also included
valuable suggestions to the attorney concerning the method of
conducting an evidentiary hearing in a federal district court.
Sokol also discusses the limitations on the writ's availability.
First and most important is the limitation that a state prisoner
may not be awarded federal habeas relief unless he has exhausted available state remedies. This doctrine, based solely on
comity between the states and the federal government, is now
codified. 14 Closely connected with the exhaustion requirement is
the limitation that a state prisoner forecloses his right to federal
relief if he has deliberately by-passed his remedies in the state
court." ' Another limitation is that of a repetitive or successive
application for relief on behalf of the same prisoner, where the
issues raised have previously been adjudicated.1 6 Finally, Sokol
considers as a limitation on the writ's availability the previously mentioned motion to vacate sentence filed by the federal
prisoner pursuant to statute. 17 There is no question, of course,
that the section 2255 motion is a limitation on the writ's availability since section 2255, insofar as the federal prisoner is concerned, is a statutorily compelled substitute for habeas corpus,
except where the relief afforded by that section is "inadequate or
ineffective to test the validity of his detention." 8s Generally
speaking, however, the principles applicable to habeas corpus
are also applicable to section 2255 proceedings.
A section entitled "Problems Peculiar to the Indigent" discusses the benefits to which an impoverished habeas or section
2255 applicant is entitled. This is a rather vital consideration
since the vast majority of prisoners who seek such relief are unable to pay either the costs of litigation or an attorney's fee.
Here, Sokol explains who qualifies as an indigent; the affidavit
of poverty required to institute an in forma pauperis proceeding;
the necessity for appointment of counsel in such proceeding; and
the criteria for obtaining a transcript of trial, or transcript of
hearing, at the expense of the state or federal government.
Sokol also provides in his book a most valuable appendix in
which he sets out all the federal statutes applicable to habeas and
section 2255 cases; the applicable federal rules of civil proce14. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
15. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958) ; Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).

17. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
18. Ibid.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

1966]

South Carolina
Law
Boox
REReview,
ViEws Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9

dures; and a comprehensive set of forms for the attorney who

may be appointed to represent an indigent prisoner in some
habeas or section 2255 proceeding. Suffice it to say that the
set of forms is complete since it, thoughtfully, includes a
sample "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel."
WALTON MoLEoD*
Associate, Pope and Schumpert
Newberry, South Carolina

*From July, 1964 to July, 1965, Mr. McLeod served as a law clerk to
Honorable Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and had as one of his primary duties reviewing and suggesting
the disposition of appeals from habeas corpus and section 2255 denials.
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WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE by Alpheus
Thomas Mason (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965. Pp. 354.
$6.50).
In 1889 with the backing of the Governor of Ohio, thirty-two
year old William Howard Taft first sought a seat on the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1902 and 1906 Taft reluctantly declined President Theodore Roosevelt's offers of
appointment to the Supreme Court in order to continue in the
posts of Governor of the Philippines and Secretary of War respectively. In 1921 on the day that Chief Justice White died,
Taft included in a letter to a friend in Washington the following
list of his qualifications for the newly vacant post.
...I have had federal judicial experience, too. 1. Three
years on the State bench. 2. Two years solicitor general,
U.S. 3. Eight years presiding judge, U.S. Circuit. 4. Four
years Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. 5. Four years secretary of war. 6. Four years president. 7. Eight years Kent
professor, Yale University, five hours a week Federal Constitutional Law, except one year Chairman National War
Labor Board and one year arbitrator in case between Canadian government and Grand Trunk Railway. That would
seem to indicate pretty continuous service in the line of
judicial and other duties preparing one for service on the
Supreme Court.
Taft finally joined the Court later that year at the age of sixtyfour, succeeding the Chief Justice whom he himself had appointed. William Howard Taft: Chief Justice by Alpheus
Thomas Mason presents an evaluation of Taft's work in that
high position. For success, Mason believes, a Chief Justice must
be a good administrator, a leader capable of accommodating the
clash of the justices' personalities and also a statesman.
During Taft's first year at the helm, the Court disposed of
almost a hundred more cases than ever before and cut the period
between filing and hearing time from fifteen to less than twelve
months. From 1921 to 1928 Taft paced the Court by writing an
average of thirty opinions per term as compared with his colleagues' average of twenty. Mason ranks Taft along with Fuller
and Hughes as the Court's most effective administrators.
Taft also worked hard at massing the Court. To this end,
Mason writes, "he persuaded, by example, frowned on dissents,
exploited personal courtesy and charm, maximized the assign-
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ment and reassignment powers, relied on the expertise of his
associates."
During his tenure on the high bench, Taft wrote 253 opinions
for the Court and only three dissenting opinions. He observed
to Justice Clarke:
I don't approve of dissents generally, for I think in many
cases where I differ from the majority, it is more important
to stand by the Court and give its judgment weight than
merely to record my individual dissent where it is better to
have the law certain than to have it settled either way.
Taft once described his role as that of an impressario with his
company of artists. In assigning cases Taft took advantage of
Holmes' grasp of the common law, Brandeis' knowledge of tax
law and rate litigation and Sutherland's experience with water
and irrigation rights cases. He regarded Van Devanter as the
strongest man on the Court, called him his "chancellor" and
relied upon him to "keep the Court consistent with itself." It
was agreed not to decide cases in which the senile Justice
McKenna's vote would be decisive. The Chief Justice's efforts
to weld the Court together are described by Mason as "extraordinarily successful" during his first three years. After that
dissents increased. Taft's chagrin at this development is reflected
in his observations that the defected Stone "hungered for the
applause of the law-school professors" and that the aged Holmes
was being egged by Brandeis into writing dissents in advancewhich, indeed, Holmes admitted to Pollock.
Taft's persistent outside activity on behalf of judicial reform
wins from Mason the accolade of "judicial architect without
peer." The Judges Bill of 19251 which Taft helped to lobby
through Congress embodied reforms which he had long advocated. As early as 1908 he had urged that the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction be generally limited to "those cases which
are typical and which give an opportunity to the Court to cover
the whole field of the law upon the subject involved." One appeal
from the trial court, he felt, was all that any party should be
entitled to. Revised federal rules of civil procedure, another
Taft project, failed to pass Congress at that time due to the
opposition of Senator Walsh of Montana. It is Mason's contention that Taft devoted so much effort to these measures because
1. 43 Stat. 936.
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he believed that a reformed judiciary could, in the author's
words, better "counteract the disruptive influence of wild-eyed
reformers."
As judicial statesman, Taft is rated less highly by Mason who
uses eight opinions which Taft wrote for the Court and one of
his dissenting opinions as the basis for a consideration of the
Chief Justice's "constitutional creed." The opinions in Truax v.
Corrigan2 and Wolf Packing Co. v. [Kansas] Court of Industrial Relations3 are offered as examples of Taft's pitting the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment against state labor legislation. Taft's opinion in Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co.4 in which a Congressional tax on the income of concerns employing child labor is found to be in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment is
contrasted with his opinion in Adkins v. Childrens Hosp.5 in
which he dissents from the Court majority's view that a Congressional minimum wage act covering women in the District of
Columbia was invalid under that same clause of the fifth
amendment. Stafford v. WallaceO and Board of Trade v. Olsen7
which upheld broad congressional power under the commerce
clause display Taft opinions which follow "squarely in the
Marshall tradition." In his opinions in Meyers v. United States8
and Em parte Grossman,0 Taft broadly interpreted the removal
and pardoning powers of the President. And in Olmtead v.
United States'0 Taft's opinion affirming the conviction of the
leader of a multi-million dollar bootlegging ring despite fourth
and fifth amendment objections to the use of wire tap evidence
was consistent with his campaign for stricter law enforcement.
These opinions, Mason points out, are generally in accord with
personal convictions which the Chief Justice had held throughout his public life. As early as 1894, for example, Taft in a
typical address had urged the graduating seniors at the University of Michigan Law School to "call strictly to account public
men 'for utterances or conduct likely to encourage resentment
2. 257
3. 267
4. 259
5. 261
6. 258
7. 262
8. 272
9.267
10. 277

U.S. 312 (1921).
U.S. 552 (1925).
U.S. 20 (1922).
U.S. 525 (1923).
U.S. 495 (1922).
U.S. 1 (1923).
U.S. 52 (1926).
U.S. 87 (1925).
U.S. 438 (1928)
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against the guaranties of law, order and property.'" Any inconsistency between this philosophy and Taft's judicial opinions
may be explained, the author suggests, by Taft's high regard
for judicial stability. Mason's test of judicial statesmanship is
"the ability to weigh realistically the strength of the popular will
and its claim to prevail." Taft, he claims, along with many other
justices did not meet this test.
Mason's book is not of the scope and dimension of his biographies of Brandeis and Stone. After all Taft already had his
Pringle. But this by-product of Mason's current comprehensive
study of the office and powers of the Chief Justice of the United
States is valuable for its newly published material concerning
Taft, the Chief Justice.
GEORGE D. HAIM AUGH, JR.
Associate Professor of Law
University of South Carolina
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